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Sensor Switching Control Under Attacks Detectable
by Finite Sample Dynamic Watermarking Tests
Pedro Hespanhol, Matthew Porter, Ram Vasudevan, and Anil Aswani
Abstract—Control system security is enhanced by the ability
to detect malicious attacks on sensor measurements. Dynamic
watermarking can detect such attacks on linear time-invariant
(LTI) systems. However, existing theory focuses on attack detec-
tion and not on the use of watermarking in conjunction with
attack mitigation strategies. In this paper, we study the problem
of switching between two sets of sensors: One set of sensors has
high accuracy but is vulnerable to attack, while the second set of
sensors has low accuracy but cannot be attacked. The problem is
to design a sensor switching strategy based on attack detection
by dynamic watermarking. This requires new theory because
existing results are not adequate to control or bound the behavior
of sensor switching strategies that use finite data. To overcome
this, we develop new finite sample hypothesis tests for dynamic
watermarking in the case of bounded disturbances, using the
modern theory of concentration of measure for random matrices.
Our resulting switching strategy is validated with a simulation
analysis in an autonomous driving setting, which demonstrates
the strong performance of our proposed policy.
Index Terms—Dynamic watermarking, observer switching con-
trol, finite sample tests
I. INTRODUCTION
THE secure and resilient control of cyber-physical systems(CPS) requires safe operation in the face of malicious
attacks that can occur on either the physical layer (e.g.,
sensors and actuators) or the cyber layer (e.g., communica-
tion and computation capabilities)[1]. Real-life incidents like
the Maroochy-Shire incident [2], the Stuxnet worm [3], and
others [4] illustrate the importance of concerns about CPS
security. One approach to secure control has been to focus on
cybersecurity of CPS [5], [6], [7], [8], but this does not fully
exploit the physical aspects of CPS. An alternative is attack
identification and detection considering the interplay between
the cyber and physical parts of CPS [9], [4], [10], [11]. Many
of these techniques are static (i.e., do not consider system
dynamics) [12] or passive (i.e., do not actively control system
to identify malicious nodes and sensors) [13], [14], [15].
In contrast, dynamic watermarking is an active defense
technique that injects perturbations into the system control in
order to detect attacks [16], [17], [18], [19]. More specifically,
this method applies a private excitation to the system, which
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is a disturbance only known to the controller. Then it uses
consistency tests to detect attacks by checking for correlation
between sensor measurements and the private excitation. The
goal is to be able to detect all sensor attacks whose magnitude
exceeds some prespecified amount.
A. Asymptotic Results for Dynamic Watermarking
Research on dynamic watermarking can be divided into two
main areas of contribution: The first is the development of
statistical hypothesis testing that tries to detect corrupted mea-
surements by observing correlations between sensor outputs
and the dynamic watermark [17], [20], [18], [16], [21]. This set
of techniques apply to general LTI systems, but cannot ensure
the zero-average-power property for general attack models.
The second line of work [22], [23] considers general attack
models and develop tests able to ensure that only attacks which
add a zero-average-power signal to the sensor measurements
can remain undetected, but constrain their analysis to LTI
systems with specific structure on their dynamics.
More recently, The work done in [24] and [25] attempts to
bridge this gap by providing statistical guarantees for complex
types of attacks for general LTI systems. While both papers
address a general MIMO LTI system, the set of assumptions
are somewhat different: the former assumes open-loop stability
of the LTI system, and the latter restricts the attack form.
In particular, in [25], the tests provided are able to detect
if a general MIMO LTI system is under a fairly general
type of attack. In particular, it considers additive attacks that
can dampen/amplify the system measurements, can replay the
system from a different initial condition, or can do both. This
form of attack, while arguably simple, encompasses many of
the types of attacks reported in real-life incidents (e.g., replay
attacks [3]) as well as compensate for external disturbances not
accounted by the system model (e.g., wind when represented
via internal model principle [25]).
We proceed to briefly summarize the results of [25], as it is
the foundation for this current paper. Consider a MIMO LTI
system with partial observations
xn+1 = Axn +Bun + wn
yn = Cxn + zn + vn
(1)
for some measurement noise zn, system disturbance wn, and
attack vector vn. Suppose (A,B) is stabilizable, (A,C) is
detectable. Typically, dynamic watermarking approaches will
add an additive signal to the control input un = Kxn + en,
where K is some feedback matrix and en is our watermarking
2signal that is unknown to the attacker. Now let k′ = min{k ≥
0 | C(A+BK)kB 6= 0}. If we define the test vectors
ψ⊤n =
[
(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤ e⊤n−k′−1
]
, (2)
and the following holds [25]:
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 ψnψ
⊤
n =
[
CΣ∆C
⊤ +ΣZ 0
0 ΣE
]
(3)
for some specific matrices Σ∆,ΣE,ΣZ , then all attack vectors
vn following a particular model [25] are constrained in power
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 v
⊤
n vn = 0. (4)
Though these tests only provide asymptotic guarantees, that
is enough to construct a statistical version of the test, similar
to [22] where a hypothesis test is constructed by thresholding
the negative log-likelihood. It follows that under a Gaussianity
assumption for process and sensor noise, the matrix in (3)
follows a well-behaved Wishart distribution. While that ap-
proach allows us to construct hypothesis tests using known
distributions, the dependency of subsequent samples make
finite sums display more complex behavior. Then it is up
to the designer of the watermark to specify a threshold that
controls the false error rate. In this framework a rejection of the
hypothesis test corresponds to detection of an attack, while an
acceptance corresponds to the lack of detection of an attack.
This notation emphasizes the fact that achieving a specified
false error rate requires changing the threshold.
B. Intelligent Transportation Systems and Observer Switching
Though the design and analysis of intelligent transportation
systems (ITS) has drawn renewed interest [23], [26], [27], [28],
[29], [30], [31], there has been less work on secure control of
ITRS. One recent work considered the use of dynamic water-
marking to detect sensor attacks in a network of autonomous
vehicles coordinated by a supervisory controller[23], while
[32] considered a platoon of vehicles where attacks happen not
only on the sensors but also on the communication channel.
A particular feature of ITS is the possibility of redundancy
in sensing. For instance, one can use a highly accurate satellite-
based sensor (susceptible to external attack) and an on-board
infrared sensor (not susceptible to external attack) in order to
obtain spatial data. Then, one way of safeguarding a system
susceptible to attacks is to switch from the high accuracy
sensor to the on-board sensor when an attack is detected
[33]. This approach naturally leads to systems with distributed
observers with dynamic switching decision rules [34], [35].
In this scenario, it is crucial to design hypothesis tests that
are able to detect attacks while having a decision rule that
correctly selects which observer is to be used. Because control
switching occurs at finite instances in time, the previous
asymptotic results of dynamic watermarking cannot be used
for this purpose. The reason, which is subtle, is that hypothesis
tests based on characterization of asymptotic distributions will
not have the correct theoretical properties in order to ensure
proper control of the false alarm rate. Consequently, new finite
sample hypothesis tests need to be constructed.
The first contribution of this paper it to provide finite-
time guarantees on attack detection via dynamic watermarking,
which to the best of our knowledge has not been done before.
Namely, we provide statistical tests that provide finite-time
guarantees on attack detection, instead of relying of asymptotic
behavior of sums of random matrices. We also relate the
magnitude of an attack to our test power, by describing the
inherent trade-off between the test capability of triggering true
detection, and the magnitude of the attacks that are allowed to
remain undetected in the long run. The finite sample analysis
of dynamic watermarking requires the use of random matrix
concentration inequalities, which are useful in analyzing the
matrices involved in the evolution of LTI system dynamics.
The second major contribution of this paper is to provide finite
sample concentration-based tests, which allow us to detect
attacks and allow switching decisions based on such tests
to correctly report attack detections infinitely often. Namely,
if there is no attack, we develop a finite sample test that
falsely reports attacks only a finite number of times. This is
a crucial feature because it also implies that in the long-run
the switching rule based on such a test is correctly selecting
which observer is active infinitely often.
C. Outline
In Sect. II, we define our notation for this paper. We also
present the random matrix concentration inequalities that we
use to perform our finite sample analysis. Next, in Sect. III we
present our general LTI framework with switching observers.
Then, we apply the concentration inequalities to the LTI setting
in Sect. IV in order to obtain appropriate concentration for
the matrices involved. In Sect. V and Sect. VI, we present
the finite sample consistency tests and a simple threshold that
relates the attack magnitude to the power of our test. Next,
in Sect. VI we provide some numerical results demonstrating
our approach on an autonomous vehicle application.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define all relevant notation concerning
the randommatrix analysis done throughout the paper. We also
define the key concepts of Stein’s Method [36], [37] applied
to matrices and the relevant matrix concentration inequalities
that will be used. This method turns out to be key to our
finite sample analysis of dynamic watermarking, as it involves
analyzing sums of inter-temporal dependent matrices.
A. Notation
We use the symbol ‖·‖ for the spectral norm of a matrix,
which is the largest singular value of a general matrix. The
space of d × d Hermitian real-valued matrices is denoted
by Hd. Moreover, the symbols λmax(A), λmin(A) are re-
spectively the maximum and the minimum eigenvalues of
an Hermitian matrix A ∈ Hd. The symbol  refers to the
semidefinite partial order, namely A  B if and only if B−A
is positive semi-definite (p.s.d). For a matrix A, we let (A)ij
denote the (ij)-th element of A. We let tr(·) do the denote the
trace operator.
We also define a master probability space (Ω,F , P ) and a
filtration {Fk} contained in the master sigma algebra:
Fk ⊂ Fk+1 and Fk ⊂ F , ∀k ≥ 0. (5)
3Given such filtration we also define the conditional expectation
Ek[·]. We also let ǫ denote a Radamacher random variable, that
takes values in {−1, 1} with equal probability. The random
matrix concentration inequalities involved in this work are
derived based on the method of exchangeable pairs based on
the Stein’s Method [36]. Let Z and Z ′ be random vectors
taking values in a space Rd. We say that (Z,Z ′) is an
exchangeable pair if it has the same distribution as (Z ′, Z).
Next, we define a matrix Stein pair:
Definition 1. Let Z and Z ′ be an exchangeable pair of random
vectors taking values in a space Z , and let ψ : Z → Hd be a
measurable function. Define the random Hermitian matrices
X = ψ(Z) and X ′ = ψ(Z ′). (6)
We say that (X,X ′) is a matrix Stein pair if there is a constant
β ∈ (0, 1] for which E[X −X ′|Z] = βX a.s..
Note it follows from the above definition that E[X ] = 0.
Also, β is called the scale factor of the pair (X,X ′).
Lastly, we present the concept of dilations, which are used
to derive our results. A symmetric dilation of a real-valued
rectangular matrix B is
D(B) =
[
0 B
B⊤ 0
]
(7)
Note that D(B) is always symmetric, and it satisfies the
following useful property:
D(B)2 =
[
0 BB⊤
B⊤B 0
]
(8)
Moreover, observe that the norm of the symmetric dilation
has a useful relationship with the norm of the original matrix
λmax(D(B)) = ‖D(B)‖ = ‖B‖. We will construct bounds
for symmetric matrices and then we will extend those bounds
to non-symmetric matrices by using dilations.
B. Matrix Concentration Inequalities
In order for us to develop finite sample tests we require
matrix concentration inequalities. The random matrices in-
volved in this paper are not independent in the general case.
We first present a version of matrix Hoeffding inequality for
conditionally independent sums of random matrices, that is
random matrices that become independent after conditioning
on another matrix. This theorem, and the following theorems
about concentrations, were first introduced by [37], as gener-
alizations of the (respective) independent cases.
Proposition 1. [37] Consider a finite sequence (Yk)(k≥1) of
random matrices in Hd that are conditionally independent
given an auxiliary random matrix Z and finite sequences
(Pk)k≥1 and (Qk)k≥1 of deterministic matrices inH
d. Assume
that
E[Yk|Z] = 0, Y
2
k  P
2
k , E[Y
2
k |(Yj)j 6=k]  Q
2
k a.s.∀k, (9)
then for all t ≥ 0 we have
P
(
λmax
(∑
k=0
Yk
)
≥ t
)
≤ d · e−t
2/2σ2 (10)
where σ2 = 12‖
∑
k P
2
k +Q
2
k)‖.
Next we present a version of the McDiarmid inequality for
self-reproducing random matrices.
Proposition 2. [37] Let z = (Z1, ..., Zn) be a random vector
taking values in a space Z , and, for each index k, let Z ′k
and Zk be conditionally i.i.d. given (Zj)j 6=k . Suppose that
H : Z → Hd is a function that satisfies the self-reproducing
property
n∑
k=1
(H(z)− E[H(z)|(Zj)j 6=k]) = s · (H(z)− E[H(z)]) a.s.
(11)
for a parameter s > 0, as well as the bounded difference
property
E[(H(z)−H(Z1, ..., Z
′
k, ..., Zn))
2|z]  P 2k (12)
for each index k a.s., where Pk is a deterministic matrix in
Hd. Then, for all t ≥ 0,
P{λmax(H(z)− E[H(z)]) ≥ t} ≤ d · e
−st2/L (13)
for L =
∥∥∑n
k=1 P
2
k
∥∥.
Now we provide an essential property that is called sym-
metrization, which is a generalization for summation of the
symmetrization property presented in [37] for a single matrix:
Lemma 1. Let {Xi}
n
i=1 be a sequence of random Hermitian
matrices with E[Xi] = 0. Then
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi
)]
≤ E
[
tr
(
e2
∑
n
i=1 ǫiXi
)]
(14)
where {ǫi}
n
i=1 are i.i.d. Radamacher random variables.
Proof. First, we construct a sequence of copies {X ′i}
n
i=1
independent from {Xi}
n
i=1, and let E
′ denote the expectation
with respect to {X ′i}
n
i=1. So we have
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi
)]
= E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi−E
′[X′
i
]
)]
≤
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi−X
′
i
)]
= E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 ǫi(Xi−X
′
i
)
)]
(15)
where we have sequentially used Jensen’s inequality and then
the symmetry of (Xi−X
′
i). Now we finish the proof by noting
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi
)]
≤ E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 ǫi(Xi−X
′
i
)
)]
≤
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 ǫiXie−
∑
n
i=1 ǫiX
′
i
)]
≤
E
[
tr
(
e2
∑
n
i=1 ǫiXi
)1/2
tr
(
e−2
∑
n
i=1 ǫiX
′
i
)1/2]
=
E
[
tr
(
e2
∑
n
i=1 ǫiXi
)]
(16)
where we have sequentially used the Golden-Thompson in-
equality, the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality two times, and the
fact that both factors are identically distributed. (See [38] for
the definition of those properties.)
4III. LTI SYSTEM WITH SWITCHING
We consider a MIMO LTI system that allows the controller
to switch between two sets of sensors, and we will assume
that both the measurement and process noise have stochastic
distributions with a bounded support. Namely, we will assume
that the noise vectors have bounded norm almost surely.
A. LTI Formulation
Consider a MIMO LTI system with partial observations and
switching in the sensing
xn+1 = Axn +Bun + wn
yn = C(αn)xn + zn(αn) + αnvn
(17)
where x ∈ Rp, u ∈ Rq , y, z, v ∈ Rm, and αn ∈ {0, 1}. The
wn represents zero mean i.i.d. process noise with covariance
ΣW . Moreover, we have
Cn = C(αn) = αnC1 + (1− αn)C2
zn(αn) = αnζn + (1− αn)ηn
(18)
where ζn and ηn represent zero mean i.i.d. measurement noise
with covariance matrices Σζ  Ση, respectively. Note that
αn ∈ {0, 1} should be interpreted as the switching control
action that selects between the observability matrices C1 or
C2. The vn is as an additive measurement disturbance added
by an attacker, which can only affect the observations made
when the mode α = 1 is selected. The idea of this model is
that C1 corresponds to a more accurate set of sensors than
C2, but conversely that some subset of sensors within C1 are
susceptible to an attack whereas the set of all sensors within
C2 are not susceptible to an attack. We further assume the
process noise is independent of the measurement noise, that
is wn for n ≥ 0 is independent of ζn, ηn for n ≥ 0. Lastly we
assume both measurement and disturbance noises are bounded
in magnitude. Namely, we assume that both measurement
noise and systems disturbances are given by i.i.d. bounded
random vectors: ‖wk‖ ≤ Kw and ‖zk‖ ≤ Kz, ∀k ≥ 0.
If (A,B) is stabilizable and both (A,C1) and (A,C2) are
detectable, then an output-feedback controller can be designed
when vn ≡ 0 using an observer and the separation principle.
Let K be a constant state-feedback gain matrix such that
A + BK is Schur stable, and let Li be a constant observer
gain matrix such that A+LiCi is Schur stable for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The idea of dynamic watermarking in this context will be
to superimpose a private (and random) excitation signal en
known in value to the controller but unknown in value to
the attacker. As a result, we will apply the control input
un = Kx
′
n + en, where x
′
n is the observer-estimated state
and en are i.i.d. random vectors on a bounded support, such
that ‖ek‖ ≤ Ke, ∀k ≥ 0, with zero mean and constant variance
ΣE fixed by the controller. Let
L(α) = αL1 + (1− α)L2
Ln = L(αn)
L(α)
⊤
=
[
0 −L(α)⊤
] (19)
Moreover, let x˜⊤ =
[
x⊤ x′⊤
]
, and define:
B⊤ =
[
B⊤ B⊤
]
, D⊤ =
[
I 0
]
, and
A(α) =
[
A BK
−L(α)C(α) A+BK + L(α)C(α)
]
.
(20)
Then the closed-loop system with private excitation is given
by:
x˜n+1 = A(αn)x˜n +Ben +Dwn + L(αn)(zn(αn) + αnvn).
(21)
If we define the observation error δ′ = x′ − x, then with the
change of variables xˇ⊤ =
[
x⊤ δ′⊤
]
we have the dynamics
xˇn+1 = A(αn)xˇn+Ben+Dwn+L(αn)(zn(α)+αvn) (22)
where we further define the following matrices
B⊤ =
[
B⊤ 0
]
, D⊤ =
[
I −I
]
, L(α) = L(α),
and A(α) =
[
A+BK BK
0 A+ L(α)C(α)
]
.
(23)
Recall that A(α) is Schur stable whenever A+BK and A+
L(α)C(α) are both Schur stable.
There is one technical point that needs to be addressed
before proceeding: Since there is switching between observers,
the closed-loop system will not necessarily be stable even
though A + BK and A + L(α)C(α) are both Schur stable.
One approach to resolving this issue is limiting the rate of
switching, as follows:
Proposition 3. let P be the solution of the Lyapunov equation
A(1)PA(1)⊤ − P = −I, (24)
where I is the identity matrix. Let τ be the smallest positive
integer such that
A(0)τP (A(0)τ )⊤ − P ≤ −I. (25)
Then the the closed-loop system is stable under switching
policies where: whenever we switch from α = 1 to α = 0 we
maintain α = 0 for at least τ time steps before any possible
switching occurs to α = 1.
Lastly, we note that such a τ exists because A(0) is Schur
stable.
IV. MATRIX INEQUALITIES FOR GENERAL LTI SYSTEMS
We will now apply the abstract concentration inequalities
presented in Sect. II to our LTI setting with switching. We
will begin our analysis consider that the system is under no
attack. Under no attack we would like to keep using the most
accurate sensor – that is keeping our switching control αn ≡ 1
for all n ≥ 0. However, as it is usually observed for any
kind of tests based on random quantities, we are susceptible
to commit what is commonly known as false positive or type I
errors. Hence our goal is to provide finite sample tests based on
matrix concentration of measure such that type I errors happen
only a finite number of times throughout the evolution of the
system. This would imply that those tests report correctly that
there is no attack infinitely often. To that end, we will utilize
two observers: The first observer obtain system measurements
5from the switched system, using C(αn); The second observer
never switches and keeps measuring the system using the
vulnerable sensor, using C1. The finite-time statistical tests and
the concentration inequalities analysis presented in this section
are referring to quantities associated with the second observer.
For ease of notation and presentation we drop the subscript of
the analysis define C = C1 and L = L1. Moreover, for the
second observer we define: xˆn and δn to denote the estimate
state and observation error:
xˆn+1 = (A+BK)xˆn + LC(xˆn − xn) +Ben − Lzn (26)
and δn = xˆn − xn. Then by the same type of variable
substitution:
δn+1 = (A+ LC)δn − wn +−Lzn (27)
We will start by bounding the vector Cδn − zn:
Theorem 1. Let δn = xˆn−xn. Assume that both measurement
noise and systems disturbances are given by i.i.d. bounded
random vectors: ‖wk‖ ≤ Kw and ‖zk‖ ≤ Kz, ∀k ≥ 0. Then
when vn ≡ 0 for all n ≥ 0 we have
‖Cδn − zn‖ ≤ K¯n (28)
where K¯n = Kz +
∑n−1
k=0
∥∥CD¯k∥∥Kw + ∥∥CL¯k∥∥Kz and
(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤  K¯2nI. (29)
Moreover, it follows that
E[(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤] =
C
(
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kΣwD¯
⊤
k + L¯kΣzL¯
⊤
k
)
C⊤ +Σz
(30)
where
D¯k = −(A+ LC)
n−1−k
L¯k = −(A+ LC)
n−1−kL⊤.
(31)
Proof. Recall our definition of δn (Eq. 27) we can write:
δn = (A+LC)
nδ0−
n−1∑
k=0
(A+LC)n−1−k(Iwk+L
⊤zk). (32)
Assuming δ0 = 0, we have that
δn =
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kwk + L¯kzk. (33)
Now, we can define the following:
Cδnδ
⊤
n C
⊤ =
C
(
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kwk + L¯kzk
)(
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kwk + L¯kzk
)⊤
C⊤,
(34)
and obtain the expectation directly:
E[(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤] =
C
(
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kΣwD¯
⊤
k + L¯kΣzL¯
⊤
k
)
C⊤ +Σz.
(35)
Since zn and δn are independent for all n. Moreover, both
system disturbances and measurement noise are independent.
Under our key assumption that both measurement noise and
systems disturbances are given by i.i.d. bounded random
vectors we have that
‖δn‖ ≤
n−1∑
k=0
∥∥D¯k∥∥Kw + ∥∥L¯k∥∥Kz, (36)
and that
‖Cδn − zn‖ ≤
Kz +
n−1∑
k=0
∥∥CD¯k∥∥Kw + ∥∥CL¯k∥∥Kz = K¯n. (37)
So we have (Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤  K¯2nI.
Now consider the matrix (3) that was used in the intro-
duction to define the asymptotic tests. But now, instead of
letting n go to infinity, we keep it finite and then analyze the
finite summation of matrices. Let k′ = min{k ≥ 0 | C(A +
BK)kB 6= 0}. The existence of such k′ is guaranteed (see
[25]). Moreover, define
ψ⊤n =
[
(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤ e⊤n−k′−1
]
. (38)
Then we have:
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
ψnψ
⊤
n =
1
N
[∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤
∑N−1
n=0 (Cxˆn − yn)e
⊤
n−k′−1∑N−1
n=0 en−k′−1(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤
∑N−1
n=0 en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1
]
(39)
It suits our purposes to make sure that the above matrix is
centered (that is have zero expected value). In order to achieve
this, we construct the matrix
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Ψn =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
ψnψ
⊤
n−
1
N
[∑N−1
n=0 E[(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤] 0
0 NΣe
]
(40)
Note that it follows that: E[Ψn] = 0, ∀n ≥ 0, since Cxˆn −
yn = Cδn − zn. We wish to control the singular values of
the above matrix. We will do so by analyzing each individual
block. To ease the notation we define
ΦN =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Ψn (41)
and we define each submatrix
Φ
(1)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤−
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
E[(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤] (42)
Φ
(2)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cxˆn − yn)e
⊤
n−k′−1 (43)
Φ
(3)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1 − Σe) (44)
6such that
ΦN =
[
Φ
(1)
N Φ
(2)
N
(Φ
(2)
N )
⊤ Φ
(3)
N
]
. (45)
Our next step is to bound the norm of Φ
(1)
N .
Theorem 2. If vn ≡ 0 for all n ≥ 0, then the following
concentration inequality holds for all N ≥ 1 and all t:
P
(∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤ m · e−N
2t2/c
(1)
N (46)
where c
(1)
N = 8
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 (K¯4kI)∥∥∥.
Proof. We start by defining the matrix Yn as
Yn = (Cδn− zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤−E[(Cδn− zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤].
(47)
Now define a vector of independent i.i.d. Radamacher random
variables {ǫn}
N−1
n=0 . We use the symmetrization property to
write ∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N−1∑
n=0
Yn
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 2N
N−1∑
n=0
ǫnYn
∥∥∥∥∥ . (48)
Now we define a filtration Z = (Yn)n≥1 where Wn =
ǫnYn, n ≥ 1. Then we see that each summand Wn is condi-
tionally independent given Z , because the Radamacher random
variables are all i.i.d. This allows us to use the Hoeffding
Bound for conditionally independent sums to obtain
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N−1∑
n=0
Yn
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 2N
N−1∑
n=0
ǫnYn
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤ d · e−N
2t2/8σ2 (49)
for σ2 =
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 (K¯4kI)∥∥∥. The first inequality follows from
applying the Laplace transform method and using the property
E
[
tr
(
e
∑
n
i=1 Xi
)]
≤ E
[
tr
(
e2
∑
n
i=1 ǫiXi
)]
. (50)
We also used the fact W 2k  K¯
4
kI for all k, and the fact that
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k
K¯4kI+ E[W
2
k |(Wj)j 6=k]
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k
(
K¯4kI
)∥∥∥∥∥ (51)
since E[W 2k |(Wj)j 6=k] = E[Y
2
k |(Wj)j 6=k]  K¯
4
kI.
Next, we provide a bound on the norm of Φ
(2)
N . But before
that we need the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let e = (e1, ..., ek, ..., en) be a sequence of
random vectors taking values in a space Z . Now construct
an exchangeable pair e′ = (e1, ..., e
′
k, ..., en) where ek and e
′
k
are conditionally i.i.d. given (ej)j 6=k and k is an independent
coordinate drawn uniformly from {1, ..., n}. We define
H(e) =
[
0
∑N−1
n=0 (dn)e
⊤
n−k′−1∑N−1
n=0 en−k′−1(dn)
⊤ 0
]
(52)
where dn = (Cδn − zn). If vn ≡ 0 for all n ≥ 0, then the
function H(e) satisfies the bounded differences property
E[(H(e)−H(e′))2|e]  P¯ 2n (53)
for P¯ 2n = max{P
2
n , P
′2
n }I with positive constants P
2
n , P
′2
n :
P
′2
n = ‖E[Q
′
n|e]‖ ≤ K¯
2
n(K
2
e + ‖ΣE‖) (54)
P 2n =
(
K2e + tr(ΣE
)
× (55)∥∥∥∥∥C
(
n−1∑
k=1
D¯kΣwD¯
⊤
k + L¯kΣzL¯
⊤
k
)
C⊤ +Σz
∥∥∥∥∥ (56)
Proof. Let qn = dne
⊤
n−k′−1 − dne
′⊤
n−k′−1 and observe that
E[(H(e)−H(e′))2|e] = E
[ [
0 qn
q⊤n 0
]2
|e
]
=
E
[ [
Qn 0
0 Q′n
]
|e
]
(57)
where we have defined
Qn = dne
⊤
n−k′−1en−k′−1d
⊤
n + dne
′⊤
n−k′−1e
′
n−k′−1d
⊤
n
Q′n = en−k′−1d
⊤
n dne
⊤
n−k′−1 + e
′
n−k′−1d
⊤
n dne
′⊤
n−k′−1
(58)
Now we have
E[Qn|e] =
E[dne
⊤
n−k′−1en−k′−1d
⊤
n + dne
′⊤
n−k′−1e
′
n−k′−1d
⊤
n |e] =
(e⊤n−k′−1en−k′−1)E[dnd
⊤
n |e]+
E[e
′⊤
n−k′−1e
′
n−k′−1|e]E[dnd
⊤
n |e] (59)
Recalling that ‖ek‖ ≤ Ke ∀k ≥ 0 and (35), it follows that
‖E[Qn|e]‖ ≤
(
K2e + tr(ΣE
)
×∥∥∥∥∥C
(
n−1∑
k=1
D¯kΣwD¯
⊤
k + L¯kΣzL¯
⊤
k
)
C⊤ +Σz
∥∥∥∥∥ = P 2n . (60)
Moreover, it follows that
‖E[Q′n|e]‖ =
en−k′−1d
⊤
n dne
⊤
n−k′−1 + e
′
n−k′−1d
⊤
n dne
′⊤
n−k′−1
= (E[(d⊤n dn)|e])en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1+
(E[d⊤n dn|e])E[e
′
n−k′−1e
′⊤
n−k′−1|e] (61)
So we get
‖E[Q′n|e]‖ ≤ K¯
2
n(K
2
e + ‖ΣE‖) = P
′2
n (62)
Hence it follows that∥∥E[(H(e)−H(e′))2|e]∥∥ ≤ max{P 2n , P ′2n } (63)
So it follows that
E[(H(e)−H(e′))2|e]  P¯ 2n (64)
where P¯ 2n = max{P
2
n , P
′2
n }I.
Now we are ready to provide our theorem.
7Theorem 3. If vn ≡ 0 for all n ≥ 0, then the following
concentration inequality holds for all N ≥ 1 and all t:
P
(∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤ (m+ p) · e−N
2t2/c
(2)
N (65)
where c
(2)
N =
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 P¯ 2k∥∥∥ for P¯ 2k = max{P 2k , P ′2k }I, where
P 2k =
(
K2e + tr(ΣE
)
×∥∥∥∥∥C
(
n−1∑
k=1
D¯kΣwD¯
⊤
k + L¯kΣzL¯
⊤
k
)
C⊤ +Σz
∥∥∥∥∥
P ′2k = K¯
2
n(K
2
e + ‖ΣE‖).
(66)
Proof. We wish to provide bounds on the operator norm of
Φ
(2)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)e
⊤
n−k′−1 (67)
To achieve that, we will use the concept of matrix Stein
pairs as defined previously. Let E = (e1, ..., ek, ..., en) be a
sequence of random vectors taking values in a space Z . Now
construct an exchangeable pair E′ = (e1, ..., e
′
k, ..., en) where
ek and e
′
k are conditionally i.i.d. given (ej)j 6=k and k is an
independent coordinate drawn uniformly from {1, ..., n}. We
define H(e) as in Proposition 4:
H(e) =
[
0
∑N−1
n=0 bne
⊤
n−k′−1∑N−1
n=0 en−k′−1b
⊤
n 0
]
(68)
where bn = Cδn − zn. Since E(H(e)) = 0, this means H(e)
satisfies the self-reproducing property
N∑
n=1
H(e)− E[H(e)|(ej)j 6=(n−k′−1)] = H(e) (69)
for the choice of parameter s = 1 (see (11) for the definition
of s), since for all n ∈ {1, ..., N} we have
H(e)− E[H(e)|(ej)j 6=(n−k′−1)] =[
0 (Cδn − zn)e
⊤
n−k′−1
en−k′−1(Cδn − zn)
⊤ 0
]
(70)
Next, we use Proposition 4 to state that H(e) also satisfies the
bounded differences property. So we have
E[(H(e)−H(e′)2|e]  P¯ 2n (71)
for P¯ 2n = max{P
2
n , P
′2
n }I. Hence, we apply the McDiarmid
inequality to the dilation H(e) ∈ Hm+p to obtain
P
(∥∥∥∥ 1NH(e)
∥∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
=
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)e
⊤
n−k′−1
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤
(m+ p) · e−N
2t2/L (72)
for L =
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 P¯ 2k∥∥∥.
Now we focus on bounding the last submatrix Φ
(3)
N .
Theorem 4. The following concentration inequality holds for
all N ≥ 1 and all t:
P
(∥∥∥Φ(3)N ∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤ 2q · e−N
2t2/c
(3)
N (73)
where c
(3)
N =
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 (K¯2e I− Σe)2 + E[(ene⊤n )4]− Σ2e∥∥∥.
Proof. We wish to provide a bound on the norm of
Φ
(3)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1 − Σe) (74)
Define E¯n = en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1 −Σe. We apply the Hoeffding
bound for the independent sum to obtain
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N−1∑
n=0
E¯n
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ t
)
≤ d · e−N
2t2/2σ2 (75)
for σ2 = 12
∥∥∥∑N−1k=0 (K¯2e I− Σe)2 + E[(ene⊤n )4]− Σ2e∥∥∥, since
E¯2n 
N−1∑
k=0
(
K¯2e I− Σe
)2
(76)
and by the definition of expectation we have that E
[
E¯2n
]
=
E[(en−k′−1e
⊤
n−k′−1)
4]− Σ2e .
V. FINITE SAMPLE TESTS FOR GENERAL LTI SYSTEMS
In this section, we provide our finite sample tests based
on dynamic watermarking for general LTI Systems with
switching. In the previous section, we obtained concentration
inequalities for each of the submatrices of ΦN (45). Note Φ3
is the private excitation matrix we get to design, and so it is
in our power to choose the dynamic watermark to display a
desired concentration behavior.
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this work,
which basically characterizes the behavior of a switching rule
based on the finite-time concentration inequalities. Our switch-
ing rule is constructed by thresholding the block submatrices
Φ
(1)
N and Φ
(2)
N using the measurements of the second observer
((26) and (27)) and applying the switch on the first observer
once those thresholds are violated, and the we switch back
on violations disappear. Let S be a positive constant such that
max{c
(1)
N , c
(2)
N , c
(3)
N } ≤ NS; such an S exists when (A+BK)
and (A+LnCn) are Schur stable provided that the switching
rule satisfies the condition specified in Proposition 3.
Theorem 5. Recall the closed-loop MIMO LTI system (17)
with αn being our switching control action that chooses be-
tween two different observation matrices. Define the threshold
tN =
√
(1 + ρ)S logN/N , where ρ > 0. Let Φ
(1)
N and Φ
(2)
N
be defined using the measurements from Eq. 26 and Eq. 27.
Let αN be the switching decision rule with
• we choose the switching input αN = 0 when we have∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ < tN or ∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ < tN
• we switch from αN−1 = 0 to αN = 1 when αN−i = 0
for i ∈ {1, . . . , τ} and
∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN and ∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN .
8Moreover, let EN for all n ≥ 1 denote the event
EN =
[ ∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ > tN⋃∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ > tN
]
(77)
Then if vN ≡ 0 for all N ≥ 0, we have that
P(lim sup
N→∞
EN ) = 0. (78)
That is, under no attacks our switching rule incorrectly
switches the system only a finite number of times.
Proof. Recall that we previously proved the following matrix
concentration inequalities for each submatrix:
P
(∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN
)
≤ m · e−N
2t2
N
/c
(1)
N (79)
P
(∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN
)
≤ (m+ p) · e−N
2t2
N
/c
(2)
N (80)
for the constants c
(1)
N and c
(2)
N . Summing over all N , we have
∞∑
k=1
P
(∥∥∥Φ(j)k ∥∥∥ ≥ tk
)
≤ (m+ p)
∫ ∞
1
1
k1+ρ
dk <∞. (81)
Hence the Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies that for the event
E
(j)
N =
[∥∥∥Φ(j)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN
]
(82)
we have
P(lim sup
N→∞
E
(j)
N ) = 0, ∀j = {1, 2, 3}. (83)
Now, if we define the event
EN =
[ ∥∥∥Φ(1)n ∥∥∥ > tn⋃∥∥∥Φ(2)n ∥∥∥ > tn
]
, N ≥ 1, (84)
then it follows that
P(EN ) ≤ P

 2⋃
j=1
E
(j)
N

 ≤ 2∑
j=1
P
(
E
(j)
N
)
, N ≥ 1. (85)
So summing once more for all N gives
∞∑
k=1
P(Ek) ≤
∞∑
k=1
2∑
j=1
P
(
E
(j)
N
)
<
2(m+ p)
∫ ∞
1
1
k1+ρ
dk <∞. (86)
We obtain by applying Borel-Cantelli lemma that
P
(
lim sup
N→∞
EN
)
= 0, (87)
which is the desired result.
The result of this theorem implies that if there is no attack
to the system, the operator norm of the matrices involved can
have “large” deviations only a finite number of times, hence
we obtain that a switching rule based on tests derived from the
concentration inequalities defined previously will only trigger
attack alerts only a finite number of times. In addition, we
note that the having a second observer to compute the finite
tests is the key to ensure that the concentration inequalities
are consistent with the obtained measurements. While the first
observer measurements with switching plays the role in the
control synthesis. Lastly, we observe that we do not need
to enforce the test on
∥∥∥Φ(3)3 ∥∥∥ since this submatrix is only
composed of the watermaking signal, and the attacks do not
have the power to affect the watermarking imposed by the
controller.
VI. ATTACK MAGNITUDE THRESHOLDING
The previous section gives a finite sample test that works
properly when there is no attack. Our goal here is to determine
the trade-off between our test’s statistical power and the attack
magnitude. Namely, we are interested in how the right-hand
side of our finite sample tests are related to the magnitude of
the attack vectors. To do so, we consider the first observation
matrix under an attack yn = Cxn + zn + vn, where vn is
an additive attack. We first consider attacks that are small
perturbations and then consider more complex attacks of the
form explored in [25] . Note we have again omitted the
subscript of the observation matrix for clarity. Namely, in the
next two subsections we will consider two attack forms.
A. Perturbation Attacks
The first attack we analyze is when vn consists of a small
perturbation that could be determinstic and/or stochastic. To
begin our analysis, let δ¯n be the measurement error when the
system is under attack, and observe that
δ¯n+1 = (A+ LC)δ¯n −Dwn − L
⊤zn − L
⊤vn. (88)
Expanding this expression gives that
δ¯n = (A+LC)
nδ¯0−
n−1∑
k=0
(A+LC)n−1−k(Iwk−L
⊤zk−L
⊤vk)
(89)
where δ¯0 = δ0 = 0. So we can rewrite the above as
δ¯n =
n−1∑
k=0
D¯kwk + L¯kzk + L¯kvk = δn +
n−1∑
k=0
L¯kvk. (90)
Next we define Vn = C
∑n−1
k=0 L¯kvk−vn, and observe that the
quantity Vn is determined by the attacker since it depends upon
the values of vk. Qualitatively, we note that the magnitude of
Vn is related to the attack magnitude, since if there is no attack
then Vn ≡ 0 for all n.
Theorem 6. Consider the closed-loop MIMO LTI system (17)
with αn, tN , En as defined in Theorem 5, and suppose the
attacker chooses the perturbation attack described above. If
the attack values vk are such that there exists a positive
constant G with
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
‖Vk‖ ≤
G
N
. (91)
then we have that P(lim supn→∞En) = 0. That is, under a
perturbation attack with the above specifications the attack is
detected only a finite number of times.
9Proof. We begin by considering
Φ
(1)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤−
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
E[(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤] =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδ¯n − zn − vn)(Cδ¯n − zn − vn)
⊤−
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
E[(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤] =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤ +Dn +D
⊤
n +Mn−
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
E[(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤].
(92)
where δn is the measurement error under no attack, and
Dn =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)V
⊤
n
Mn =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
VnV
⊤
n .
(93)
Now using Theorem 2, we have that
P(
∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN ) ≤
P
(
‖
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)(Cδn − zn)
⊤−
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
E[(Cxˆn − yn)(Cxˆn − yn)
⊤]‖ ≥ tN+
− 2 ‖DN‖ − ‖MN‖
)
≤
m e
−N
2(tN−2‖DN‖−‖MN‖)
2
c
(1)
N . (94)
Next observe that
2
∥∥D¯N∥∥+ ‖MN‖ ≤ 2K¯N
N
N−1∑
n=0
‖Vn‖+
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
‖Vn‖
2
≤
2K¯NG
N
+
G2
N
. (95)
Since (A + LC) is Schur stable, then from the definition of
K¯N we immediately get that there exists a positive constant
S¯ such that K¯N ≤ S¯ for all N ≥ 1. Combining this with the
above implies that
∞∑
k=1
P(
∥∥∥Φ(1)k ∥∥∥ ≥ t(1)k ) <∞, (96)
and so the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that
∥∥∥Φ(1)N ∥∥∥ ≥ t(1)N
only finitely many times. Our next step considers
Φ
(2)
N =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cxˆn − yn)e
⊤
n−k′−1 =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδ¯n − zn − vn)e
⊤
n−k′−1 =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)e
⊤
n−k′−1 +Hn (97)
where
HN =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
Vne
⊤
n−k′−1. (98)
Now using Theorem 3, we have that
P(
∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN ) ≤
P
(
‖
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
(Cδn − zn)e
⊤
n−k′−1‖ ≥ tN − ‖HN‖
)
≤
2m e
−N
2(tN−‖HN‖)
2
c
(2)
N . (99)
Next observe that
‖HN‖ ≤
Ke
N
N−1∑
k=0
‖VN‖ ≤
KeG
N
. (100)
Combining this with the above implies that
∞∑
k=1
P(
∥∥∥Φ(2)k ∥∥∥ ≥ tk) <∞, (101)
and so the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that
∥∥∥Φ(2)N ∥∥∥ ≥ tN
only finitely many times. The remainder of the proof follows
similarly to that of the last steps of Theorem 5.
Our analysis in this subsection is capable of only providing a
simple relation between the power of our detection scheme and
the magnitude of Vn. An analysis that translates to the bounds
of each individual vn is more involved because it depends
explicitly on the structure/behavior of the matrix (A+ LC).
B. Replay Attacks
The second attack we analyze is when
vn = Cξn + ζn − (Cxn + zn) (102)
where ξn+1 = (A + BK)ξn + ωn and ωn is a bounded
disturbance. This is a replay attack [3], since it subtracts the
real sensor measurements and substitutes these with a replay
of the dynamics starting from a different initial condition. In
fact, we will perform our analysis for a more general attack
vn = Cξn + ζn − γ · (Cxn + zn), (103)
where γ ∈ R. This attack also allows for dampening or
amplifying the true sensor measurements (Cxn + zn).
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Theorem 7. Consider the closed-loop MIMO LTI system (17)
with αn, tN , En as defined in Theorem 5, and suppose the
attacker chooses the attack (103). If the attack is not trivial
(i.e., a trivial attack has vn ≡ 0 for all n ≥ 0), then we have
that P(lim supn→∞ ¬En) = 0. That is, under the attack with
the above specifications the attack is not detected only a finite
number of times.
Proof. Suppose γ 6= 0. Then the proof of Theorem 1 in
[25] shows that limN→∞Φ
(2)
N exists almost surely and is not
equal to 0. This means that P(lim supn→∞ ¬E
(2)
N ) = 0. Now
consider the case γ = 0. Then the proof of Theorem 1 in
[25] shows that limN→∞Φ
(1)
N exists almost surely and is not
equal to 0. This means that P(lim supn→∞ ¬E
(1)
N ) = 0. The
remainder of the proof by repeating the last steps of Theorem
5 for the two cases, after noting that ¬EN = ¬E
(1)
N ∨ ¬E
(2)
N
by De Morgan’s laws.
This result is stronger than Theorem 6 in that it says
all replay attacks, and more generally attacks of the form
(103), will not be detected by the finite sample tests only
a finite number of times. In fact, this result is analagous to
the zero-average-power results (4) of past work on dynamic
watermarking for LTI systems with general structure [25],
since this result says that only (trivial) replay attacks with
zero-average-power cannot be detected.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of this method,
we return to the lane keeping example used in [25] which
is based off of the standard model for lane keeping and speed
control [39]. In this model the state vector takes the form
xT = [ψ y s γ v] and input vector uT = [r a], where ψ
is heading error, y is lateral error, s is trajectory distance,
γ is vehicle angle, v is vehicle velocity, r is steering, and
a is acceleration. Linearizing about a straight trajectory at a
velocity of 10 m/s and step size of 0.05 seconds gives us an
LTI system:
A =


1 0 0 110 0
1
2 1 0
1
40 0
0 0 1 0 12
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

B =


1
400 0
1
2400 0
0 1800
1
20 0
0 120

 (104)
with C1 = C2 = [I, 0] ∈ R
3×5. The process noise and
watermark take the form of uniform random variables such that
w ∈ [−2.5× 10−4, 2.5× 10−4]5 and e ∈ [−2, 2]2. Similarly
the measurement noise for each sensor is also estimated as
uniform random variables where ζ ∈ [−1× 10−2, 1× 10−2]3
and η ∈ [−2 × 10−2, 2 × 10−2]3. For this example we can
think of the ζ measurements as localization using visual or
lidar based localization with high definition mapping, and η
as GPS localization. Finally controller and observer gains K
and L1 = L2 were chosen to stabilize the closed loop system.
For this system it was found that
c(1)n ≤ 6.7502× 10
−5n (105)
c(2)n ≤ 0.0968n. (106)
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Fig. 2. Switching Decision Values Based on the Submatrices ‖Φ
(1)
n ‖ and ‖Φ
(2)
n ‖ in Simulation of Autonomous Vehicle
Using the threshold structure defined in Theorem 5 results in
τ (1)n =
√
(1 + ρ(1))(6.7502× 10−5) log(n)/n (107)
τ (2)n =
√
(1 + ρ(2))(0.968) log(n)/n. (108)
While the finite switching guarantee given by Theorem 5 only
applies for ρ(1), ρ(2) > 0, due to the conservative nature of
the bounds in (105)-(106) in addition to the desire to also
maintain a sufficiently quick detection we instead heuristically
tune these values to find the desired balance.
For our analysis of this system, we once again consider the
two forms of attack discussed in Section VI. The perturbation
attack takes the form of random noise pulled from a uniform
distribution such that vn ∈ [−0.150.15]
3 The replay attack is
described in (102) where ξ0 = 0 and ζ and ω are uniformly
distributed such that ζ ∈ [−2.5 × 10−4, 2.5 × 10−4]3 and
ω ∈ [−2.5× 10−4, 2.5× 10−4]5.
Each attacked system, along with an un-attacked system
were simulated 1000 times for 10,000 discrete time steps.
While the perturbation attack is detected and switching occurs
almost immediately for ρ(1), ρ(2) < 1, the replay attack can
take a much longer time to be detected. Figure 1 shows the
average time to detection for each of our switching conditions
in addition to the number of trials that result in switching for
the un-attacked case plotted against the corresponding value of
ρ(1) or ρ(2). While the number of switching simulations for the
un-attacked system under switching condition 2 appear to be
quite large even when the average time to detect is relatively
large, it is important to note that many of the unwanted
switches occur in the first four discrete steps which can be
mitigated in practice by ignoring the first four values.
Choosing values of ρ(1) = ρ(2) = −0.98, each attack
was again simulated this time for 1000 discrete time steps
both with and without the switching policy. Figure 2 shows
the value of ‖Φ
(1)
n ‖ and ‖Φ
(2)
n ‖ for both normal operation
and under each of the attacks when the switching policy
is not being used. The plot shows that for both attack 1
and attack 2 the switching policy will result in an almost
immediate and consistent transfer from the attacked sensor
to the protected sensor. Furthermore, when the system is
un-attacked the values of ‖Φ
(1)
n ‖ and ‖Φ
(2)
n ‖ remain below
the switching threshold. Figure 3 compares the performance
of the lane keeping algorithm for each attack with respect
to the un-attacked performance both with and without the
switching policy. This plot shows that for both attacks the
switching policy is able to transfer to the protected sensor
before significant deviation can occur. This switch allows the
vehicles performance to gracefully degrade while avoiding
total failure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper constructed a dynamic watermarking approach
for detecting malicious sensor attacks for general LTI systems,
and the two main contributions were: to extend dynamic water-
marking to general LTI systems under a specific attack model
that is more general than replay attacks, and to show that
modeling is important for designing watermarking techniques
by demonstrating how persistent disturbances can negatively
affect the accuracy of dynamic watermarking. Our approach to
resolve this issue was to incorporate a model of the persistent
disturbance via the internal model principle. Future work
includes generalizing the attack models that can be detected
by our approach. An additional direction for future work is to
study the problem of robust controller design in the regime of
when an attack is detected.
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